The Behavioural Science of Governments
GOVERNMENTS MAKE DECISIONS BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING INSTINCTS
Below is a concise list which helps differentiate the motivations behind government decision-making, from a
behavioural science perspective. It is intended to be a quick reference with which to consult with to make
sense of why and how governments do the things they do.
No matter what industry or sector you belong, it is of critical importance to understand the various ways to influence government policy making and to gain an understanding of the drivers behind the decision-making.
Often, industries are dumbfounded by government decisions made in the face of what they believe to be overwhelming evidence to the contrary. They also perceive many decisions as originating not from rigorous research, analysis and stakeholder consultation, but from sheer bloody-mindedness: tunnel vision on an objective, no matter the competing views, data and perspectives.
Before we get to the politco-headshrinking, skim the last decade of West Australian decisions below. Then as you read the drivers list later on, see which ones you can match to each decision.
FIRST TERM: MCGOWAN, 2017 TO 2021. GOVERNMENT WITHOUT AN UPPER HOUSE MAJORITY
Year | Issue | Who Was Affected | Usual Political Alignment | Result | Stakeholder Voter Size |
2017 | Roe 8 / Perth Freight Link | Freight lobby and civil contractors | Business, Coalition-leaning | Lost | About 230 CCF WA member firms (CCF, 2017) |
2017 | Perth Modern relocation | Parents, students and alumni | Mixed | Won | 13,000 or 6,000 (petitions differ) |
2017–23 | Police pay | Police officers (WA Police Union) | Organised labour / mixed | Lost | 7,000+ |
2017–25 | Hospitals and ramping | Doctors (AMA WA) and health unions | Mixed | Partial | About 5,000 AMA WA members (AusDoc, 2024) |
2018 | Schools of the Air cuts | Regional families | Regional, Nationals | Won | About 32,000 (petition) |
2018 | Community resource centres | 105 community resource centres | Regional, Nationals | Won | 105 centres, about 395 staff and 1,000+ volunteers (Linkwest, 2018) |
2018 | Taxi plate buyback | Taxi plate owners | Mixed | Partial | About 1,035 Perth taxi plates (Dept of Transport, 2017) |
2018 | Fracking moratorium | Onshore gas industry | Big-Business, Coalition-leaning | Partial | Titles over about 2% of the State (WA Government) |
2019 | Rock lobster state stake | Commercial rock lobster fishers | Regional, Nationals-leaning | Won | About 230 boats (DPIRD) |
2019 | EPA greenhouse guidelines | LNG majors | Business, Coalition-leaning | Won | A handful of LNG operators |
2019 | Voluntary assisted dying | Churches, minority religious faiths and many parts of the medical profession | Social Conservative | Lost | 41% of Western Australians identified as Christian (ABS Census 2021) |
2020 | Industrial manslaughter | Employer groups (CCIWA, CME) | Business, Coalition-leaning | Lost | CME WA about 130 member companies; CCIWA thousands of businesses, many concerned peak body groups |
2020–26 | Westport, Fremantle to Kwinana | Fremantle council, businesses, MUA and fishers | Mixed, Organised Labour, Business Interests, Social Dimension | Lost | Up to 4,000 port-linked jobs claimed by opponents (Fremantle coalition, 2024) |
2020 | COVID hard border | Clive Palmer and business | Business, Coalition-leaning | Lost | One litigant but strong community disdain |
SECOND TERM: MCGOWAN, THEN COOK, 2021 TO 2025. GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE UPPER HOUSE
Year | Issue | Who Was Affected | Usual Party Alignment | Result | Stakeholder Voter Size |
2021 | Native forest logging ban | Timber industry and workers | Regional, Nationals and Liberal-leaning | Lost | 300 to 400 jobs lost (Minister) - timber town communities affected (30,000 people) |
2021–22 | COVID vaccine mandates | Unvaccinated workers and protest groups | Minor parties and civil liberties groups | Partial | About 1.1 million workers covered, 75% of the workforce (WA Government). Some industries got waivers, some didn't. |
2021 | Upper house electoral reform | Nationals and regional WA | Regional, Nationals | Lost | About 416,000 regional electors of 1.72 million (WAEC 2021, derived) † |
2022 | Coal power exit | Collie coal workers and unions | Organised labour | Lost | About 1,300 Collie coal workers, 1,800 with contractors. 7,500 town pop. |
2022 | Buccaneer Archipelago marine parks | Kimberley recreational fishers and charter operators | Regional | Partial | Not counted |
2022 | Doctors' pay dispute | Public hospital doctors (AMA WA) | Professional, non-aligned | Lost | About 5,000 AMA WA members (AusDoc, 2024) |
2022 | Nurses' pay dispute | Public sector nurses and midwives | Organised labour | Lost | About 23,000 |
2023 | West coast demersal closures (first round) | Recreational boat fishers, charter operators and commercial line fishers | Cross-aligned | Partial | 99 charter licence holders (Recfishwest) - wider public and hospitality (seafood consumers) |
2023 | Local government reform | WALGA and councils | Non-partisan | Lost | 139 councils, about 1,200 elected members |
2023 | Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act | Farmers, suburban landholders, Aboriginal groups | Cross-aligned | Won | About 30,000 petition signatures + widespread public outcry |
2023 | Firefighters' pay dispute | Career firefighters | Organised labour | Lost | About 1,300 career firefighters (DFES annual report 2022-23: 1,266) |
2023 | Abortion law reform | Churches, minority religious groups and pro-life groups | Social conservative | Lost | 25% to 33% of 17,514 consultation responses opposed each change (WA Health, 2023), Large 'culture war' issue with public interest |
2023 | Planning reform | WALGA and councils | Non-partisan | Lost | 139 councils, about 1,200 elected members |
2024 | Nickel royalty relief | Nickel miners | Business, Coalition-leaning | Won | Almost 10,000 related nickel jobs |
2024 | Tenancy reform | Landlords (REIWA) | Property investors, Liberal-leaning | Partial | About 220,000 rental properties (REIWA, bond data 2023) |
2024 | Short-term rental register | Short-stay hosts | Mixed | Lost | 11,556 registered short-stay properties (Consumer Protection, July 2025) |
2024 | Firearms Act | Firearm licence holders | Regional, Nationals and minor parties | Lost | About 88,000 licence holders |
2024 | Live sheep export, federal | Sheep producers | Regional, Nationals and Liberal | Lost | About 4,000 WA farms with sheep (ABARES) |
2024 | Teachers' pay dispute | Public school teachers | Organised labour | Won | Around 27,000 |
2024 | South Coast Marine Park | Commercial and recreational fishers and south coast towns | Regional, Nationals | Partial | 5,860-signature petition (Nationals WA) |
2024 | Nurses' pay, second round | Public sector nurses and midwives | Organised labour | Won | About 23,000 |
2025 | Nature Positive laws, federal | Mining and resources | Business, Coalition-leaning | Partial | Mining workforce; nickel alone almost 10,000 jobs |
THIRD TERM: COOK, 2025 ONWARDS. GOVERNMENT LOSES ITS UPPER HOUSE MAJORITY
Year | Issue | Who Was Affected | Usual Party Alignment | Result | Stakeholder Voter Size |
2022–25 | North West Shelf gas extension | Environment groups and some Traditional Owners | Greens-leaning | Lost | More than 750 appeals against the EPA recommendation (Appeals Convenor) |
2025 | Exmouth Gulf Marine Park | Recreational fishers | Regional | Ongoing | Not counted |
2025– | Firefighters' pay, current dispute | Career firefighters | Organised labour | Ongoing | About 1,400 career firefighters (DFES 1,266 in 2022-23 plus 132 funded since) |
2025 | Demersal and shark fishing ban | Commercial demersal and shark fishers | Regional, Nationals, One Nation and Liberal-leaning | Lost | 170+ commercial businesses statewide; petition of 27,000+ signatures |
2018–25 | Surrogacy reform | Conservative MPs and the Australian Christian Lobby | Social conservative, Mixed Party | Lost | NA |
2026 | University merger of UWA, Curtin and Murdoch | Curtin and Murdoch universities, students, staff, alumni and unions | Cross-aligned | Ongoing | About 123,000 students and about 17,500 staff - mass public opposition |
The above is of course not an exhaustive list and its information is there for illustrative and indicative purposes only pertaining to the thrust of the article. If you would like the full list with verfified data please contact us directly.

THE DRIVERS:
1. They believe they have an electoral mandate, having been voted into office on the promise or pledge
to do something. They seek to ‘make good’ on their electoral promises to be perceived as trustworthy, to
put ‘social capital’ in the bank.
2. They carry amongst their members deep-seated ideological inclinations to certain policy positions,
often immune to scrutiny and indifferent to opposing views. The larger the majority, the more often these
deep-seated views will sprout up in decisions. This also results in less consultation with key
stakeholders who might be affected by their policy changes.
3. They believe it politically expedient to act, or to be publicly perceived to act, in a certain way to satisfy
the media, public or the social attitudes of the day. This is why politicians love a photo opportunity: they
like to be seen to be getting things done. Style over substance.
4. Action trumps inaction and creates the optics of leadership and competence, even if not doing
anything might be the wiser option in the proper analysis. Remember, no government wants to look
indecisive as this equates to weakness and can be used against them by the press and their political
adversaries.
5. They are faced with a confronting financial, economic or scientific reality which means they are
forced to act, not necessarily in their desired manner, but through the perceived need to take action from
public expectation.
6. They seek to avoid public and personal humiliation. The threat of being perceived as objectively
incompetent, could risk their electoral prospects or cause embarrassment to the government, ministers or
departmental heads. The survival instinct kicks in. Preserving reputation at a government and ministerial
level is paramount in all their endeavours.
7. Where what constitutes the ‘public good’ is incontestable and bipartisan, governments will make
decisions in good faith and in a non-partisan manner. This is not altogether altruistic, as it creates
‘social capital’.
8. Where economic or budgetary constraints prevent the delivery of optimal outcomes to
stakeholders, token gestures are used to placate those affected and to create the optics of action and empathy. Again: action over inaction, decision over indecisiveness, a fallback argument that ‘we did something’.
9. Once a position has been announced, reversing it is read as weakness, so a failing policy will be
defended long past the point at which the evidence has turned against it. This points to the next rule.
10. Layers of bureaucracy can make procedure and protocol the cause of disruption or delay – and
hence a great excuse for political or party prevarication or incompetence: taking responsibility away
from ministers and buying time on taking action, if taking action is perceived too risky to the government’s
reputation or if there is internal debate and disagreement.
11. Further ‘unaccountability sinks’ can be used, such as outsourcing methodology and analysis to
third party external consultants who will simply 'construct the affirmative case' for the government’s
desired policy. Where the policy fails, or public sentiment cannot be harnessed as expected, ‘the advice’
was the consultant’s and hence their fault. Vast swathes of public money is spent on exercises such as
this, when the work could have been done at a departmental level in consultation with relevant industry.
Yet not only can outsourcing responsibility for information and advice inoculate the government from
responsibility (to a certain degree) it can also simply act as a ‘rubber stamp’ for a decision already
internally taken by the government on arbitrary or ideological reasons.
12. ‘Ideological capture’ of public sector and governmental departments can have serious influence in
the development and rollout of policy, as it colours the information and advice given to ministers and
also influences the outcomes of policy implementation – as well as sometimes even the construction of
the legislation and regulations themselves. In practical sense it means that going via departmental routes
to the government’s ear, cannot always be relied upon. And vice versa. It must also be said that often
high-level public-sector appointments can also be made from a ‘political’ dimension who develop their
own narratives often in misalignment with the industries they are meant to oversee.
NEXT STEPS:
If your organisation or business requires help with understanding government positions on certain policy topics, or if you require advice for how best to influence government decision making and public attitudes - please get in touch today for a confidential discussion.
FOR FURTHER READING:
- Rory Sutherland, 'Policy-making under uncertainty', Behavioural Public Policy 2, no. 2 (2018)
- R. Kent Weaver, 'The Politics of Blame Avoidance', Journal of Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1986)
- Christopher Hood, The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011).
- Barry M. Staw, 'Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action',
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16, no. 1 (1976)
- Dan Davies, The Unaccountability Machine (London: Profile Books, 2024).




Comments